The Nature of Natural Law Arguments

Introduction

I remember the first time I heard that men should have short hair because the Bible says, “Does not nature itself teach you that if a man wears long hair it is a disgrace for him?” (1 Cor. 11:14). I was confused because many male animals in nature have longer hair than the females, and male birds are often more adorned than the females. My father-in-law quickly cleared this up: Paul did not mean “nature” as in “all of creation,” he meant it as the “nature” of a thing – namely, a man. The same confusion exists for many today when it comes to “arguments from nature” – aka, “the natural law.”

What is a Natural Law Argument?

The term “Natural Law” is sometimes used as equivalent to the “laws of nature,” (i.e., the order which governs the material universe). In these cases, the “law” is really more of  a description of how things are - not necessarily how they should be. Thus, it could refer to rocks falling, plants photosynthesizing, animals sleeping, etc. However, its more academic use regards moral philosophy. Here it refers to the existence and knowability of moral laws based on the nature of things (what they are – not what they do).

Sometimes natural law is defined in religious terms (e.g. “the rules prescribed to us by God”), but this is not precisely what natural law arguments propose. Aristotle had a robust understanding of natural law without any command-giving god involved, and Aquinas, although he believed that God was the cause of existence, could apply Aristotle’s reasoning without need to reference God. This is because natural law can be derived from observations and experience of things in the world around us. This works whether or not natural laws are expanded or explicated by deity (for more on this see Feser’s article). By knowing what something is and what its purpose is, we can objectively determine what is good or bad for it.

What I wish to address in this article is a confusion that exists among many today over how one discovers this natural law, and the faulty counter-arguments that result from such confusion.

What Isn’t a Natural Law Argument?

In popular speech, the word “nature” often simply refers to “the way things are.” Rain falls, animals sleep, lightning strikes, etc. because that’s how nature works. Thus, when “nature” is called upon for evidence in a natural law argument (say, against rape, homosexuality, or abortion), many will cite cases where “these things happen in nature” (e.g., the animal kingdom) as counterexamples. Another confused attempt to wield natural law is to argue that because something feels  “natural” it must be moral.

Now, these kinds of arguments are ridiculous – as shown by numerous counterexamples. Animals kill their own kind, devour one another, pick bugs off each other to eat, play with their own feces, and engage in incest – but no one argues on this basis that humans ought to do such things. Further, pedophiles, rapists, gay bashers, and others cite their “natural” urges for why they do such things – but this is not considered a legitimate excuse in these cases either.

These poor attempts at using beasts to validate human action notwithstanding, what specifically concerns me here is that to even offer such faulty arguments represents a serious confusion over what is meant by “nature” in natural law arguments. What occurs “in nature” is not what ought to occur based on a thing’s “nature.”

“Nature” in Natural Law Arguments

What is meant by “nature” in natural law arguments has to do with the ontological status of a thing (what it is), as well as its purpose (what it’s for). These are obtainable through observation and experience. We discover what something is and what it is for by looking at what it does in a special way – what makes it best for accomplishing a goal, for example.

To use with a fairly neutral example, consider a knife. A knife is considered “good” to the extent that it can accomplish its purpose. Because a knife is clearly made for cutting, its goodness can be judged by what contributes to its ability to cut (e.g., sharpness). In other words, what a knife is (its nature) and what it is for (its purpose) determines what makes for its good. If the knife is sharp – it is a good knife. If it is dull, it is  bad knife. (Note that what state it is currently in has nothing to do with what its good is – sharp knives and dull knives are still knives – thus, in natural law arguments, what state something is in does not tell us anything about whether it should be in that shape.)

Given all this, we can objectively evaluate at things that happen to the knife – what contributes to accomplishing its goals (e.g., sharpening) is good for it, what detracts from accomplishing those goals (e.g., banging on a rock) is bad. In the same way we can look at other things – in the case of morality, persons - and evaluate the good or bad for that thing as well.

Clearing Up the Confusion

Given that natural law arguments work by considering what a thing is and what it is for – and not by looking at how things behave out in the world – it should be clear how confused many “arguments from nature” really are.

Advocates for homosexuality, for example, will often point out that animals sometimes engage in “homosexual acts” (they don’t actually - but that’s another issue). But whether they do or do not, this says absolutely nothing about whether or not they should do so (much less what humans should do!). This is for two reasons: (1) that’s not how natural law arguments work and, (2) many animals engage in many activities that would be evil for humans to engage in. 

Further, simply because a person feels “naturally” drawn to certain acts, that also says absolutely nothing about whether or not they should perform them. Again, this is for two reasons: (1) that’s not how natural law arguments work and, (2) many humans are drawn to activities that are evil for humans  to engage in.

Conclusion

Just because something is in a certain state, that does not make it “natural” in any relevant sense to moral arguments based on natural law. A drawer full of dull knives does not make a dull knife a good knife. Further, what happens in nature is not always “natural.” A broken leg is “natural” if the leg is run over by a car – but it is not “natural” in the sense of contributing to human good. Finally, human goods are known by human nature – not another animal’s. Thus when someone cites human nature in an argument for or against any human action, it will not suffice to point to “things that happen in nature” as a counterexample.

Making a Solid Counter Argument

(Just kidding  -we aren’t doing this!)

Arguing Against Conclusions with Similar Arguments

It often occurs in debates that arguments for one thing also support something else with which the original arguer would disagree. In these cases it can be very powerful to point out such a fault. Often statements like this begin with, “Yeah but that’s like saying . . . ” It is also often the case - especially with people who have no formal training in critical thinking - that counter arguments and counter examples need to be carefully spelled out in order to show the original argument’s flaws.

Here’s how to do it.

Step One: Reconstruct the Original Argument in a Valid Form

This is not as difficult as it might sound – people do it all the time. And once you are good at it, you can just do it in your head. But you do need to make sure you do it right. This basically means learning logic – but it does not have to be a massive amount, as most arguments are of just a few common forms.

Without going into a lesson on formal logic, let’s just say that in general arguments will have a “principle premise” (a statement that gives an overall principle) and a “particular premise” (which gives an example that falls under that principle ) which, when combined, lead to a conclusion (a statement that applies the principle to the particular). For example:

All bachelors are male. [Principle]
Joe is a bachelor. [Particular]
Joe is male. [Conclusion]

Now here’s the hard part: almost no one states all three premises together in normal speech. To do so would be cumbersome and annoying (like talking to a philosophy major). So “arguments” are usually left incomplete, because we assume that a reasonable person will work it out for themselves.

For example, if I tell my wife, “Honey – I am not taking the garbage out because it is raining,” I don’t have to state the principle that “I always try to avoid getting my clothes wet.” This is also where most misunderstandings come in. My wife might think that my principle is, “I’d rather sit on the couch than help with chores.”  So we have to be careful when trying to reconstruct an argument.

The best way is to look for necessary connection between premises. For example, if I say “That car must be black, because it is Fred’s,” it is clear that the only way to make such an inference valid would be if, underlying it, was the principle that all of Fred’s cars are black. Let’s reconstruct the argument by filling in this missing principle premise:

All Fred’s cars are black. [Unstated principle]
That car is Fred’s. [Stated particular]
That car must be black. [Stated conclusion]

Because the principle premise is true, or easily proven true, and the argument is valid in form, the argument works and can be evaluated.

But suppose that instead I mistakenly said, ”That car must be Fred’s because it is black.” Someone might say, “That doesn’t make sense, because then your car would be Fred’s too!” Why is this the case? Because the principle behind , “That car must be Fred’s because it is black” must, logically, be “All black cars are Fred’s.” Otherwise, the argument would not work.

Step 2: Make Similar Counter Arguments

So how to show this? The best way to do this is to take the principle premise from the faulty argument, expose it, and then apply it to an argument of the same form but with a different particular premise leading to a conclusion the original arguer would not accept. In the above example it would be:

All black cars are Fred’s. [Unstated principle]
That car is black. [Stated particular]
That car must be Fred’s. [Stated conclusion]

Because the principle premise is clearly false, and the argument is valid in form, the argument can be shown to be faulty by using a counter argument of the same form:

All black cars are Fred’s. [Same pprinciple]
Your car is black. [New particular]
Your car must be Fred’s car. [New, unwelcome conclusion]

In a valid argument, at least one of the premises must be false if the conclusion is false. Because  the particular premise in this counter argument is clearly true, and the conclusion is clearly false, there is only one option left: the principle is false (and therefore the original argument is faulty as well).

Making Strong Counter Arguments

In order to make the point even more strong, obvious or extreme examples are often required. For example, if someone argues that polygamy is moral because there are animals that are polygamous, the argument (if valid) would have this form:

Whatever an animal does is moral for humans to do. [Unstated principle]
Animals are polygamous. [Stated particular]
Polygamy is moral for humans. [Stated conclusion]

A counter-argument can be made by accepting the faulty major premise, but applying it to a conclusion that is (hopefully!) unacceptable to the original arguer in the hopes that the  folly of the argument will be made clear:

Whatever an animal does is moral for humans to do. 
Animals are cannibalistic. 
Cannibalism is moral for humans. 

Since the particular premise is true, and the argument form is valid, then the only way to avoid the absurd conclusion is to recognize that the major premise is false. But if it is false, the original argument fails as well. This would probably be stated something like, “Well if it’s true that polygamy is moral because there are animals that are polygamous, then cannibalism would be moral too!”

Conclusion

So when someone makes a statement that “X is true because of Y,” there is usually a principle behind X and Y (call it Z) that drives the argument. If you can identify ‘Z’ by logically reconstructing the argument in a valid form, then you might discover that it is a flawed principle. If this is the case, then applying that flawed principle to another particular case will often be useful in highlighting the principle’s failure.

Rhetorical Post Script

In moral debates it is often helpful to use extreme particular examples When someone cites more obvious or extreme examples of evils in the world in order to show someone how bad their argument is, they are not necessarily equating the new example with the original issue. Suppose someone is arguing about birth control with a person who is pro-life. The arguer might attack arguments for birth control that use the same principle and form as arguments for abortion. Or someone might show that some arguments for homosexual marriage are the same principle and form as those for pedophilia. but in neither case is one saying the two issues being compared are the same. Thus, retorts such as, “Are you saying that X and Y are the same thing???” or “How dare you compare X and Y???” are illegitimate.

Transubstantiation and the Christian Faith

I can’t stand bad arguments or faulty reasoning, no matter which side of a debate I am on. But when bad thinking can lead to loss of faith, I really can’t keep quiet. On a recent radio show, one of the  guests was asked for his thoughts on the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. His reply was brief (it only lasted from 86:30 – 90:00), and I am sure he has more that he could have said on the issue – but in that time he managed to make several claims that should raise red flags for all Christians regardless of their stance on transubstantiation (indeed regardless of whether the doctrine is even true).

What is Transubstantiation?

In order to understand what the doctrine of transubstantiation teaches, and why the guest’s comments are so problematic, we first need to understand the philosophy of change that the doctrine employs.

Substantial vs. Accidental Change

In Aristotelian philosophy there are two types of change corresponding to two kinds of descriptions of a thing: substance and accidents. Substance refers to what a thing is at its core, while accidents are modifications of that substance. What something is at its deepest level is its substance, while how that thing differs from other things of the same substance are its accidents. So for example, males and females are both substantially human – they differ by gender, but gender is accidental to humanity because being human does not determine gender.

This distinction gives rise to a distinction in the ways things can change: substantially or accidentally. If a man’s skin turns red from being in the sun too long, he has undergone accidental change. Skin color is not determined by the substance of humanity, because it is a difference among humans. Thus, to change skin color is not to go from being human to being non-human.

Accidental Change

Now, to go from being human to being non-human would be a substantial change, because the “what” would have changed. Substantial change is not often recognized as such outside of philosophical circles, but it happens every day and is often reflected in how we name things. When a cow (which is a living substance) dies, it turns into meat (non-living material), and then – if eaten – turns into the body of another living being. When a tree is cut down it goes from being a tree to being wood, and if the wood is burnt, it changes from wood to smoke. Those are examples of substantial change.

Substantial Change

Note that just as a thing may undergo accidental change without going through substantial change, a thing might also undergo substantial change without going through accidental change. In fact, it is because the accidental qualities of a thing may remain after a substantial change that we do not always take notice of such change (as when a sleeping cow dies).

Truck: Accidental Change without Substantial Change
Tree: Substantial Change without Accidental Change

Transubstantial Change

Now, transubstantiation is the Latin word for “substance” with the prefix “trans” which indicates change (e.g., transportation). So transubstantiation means the changing of a substance. Specifically, in Roman Catholic theology it is the theological expression of the substantial change the elements of communion undergo when they change from being bread and wine to being the body and blood of Jesus Christ.

Transubstantiation is the name for the process of what happens during communion – the substantial change of bread and wine into flesh and blood without the accidental change of these elements’ appearances. Thus, transubstantiation is not believed because of any perceived accidental change in the elements (for, according to the doctrine, there is none). The bread and wine are perceived in the same way before and after the change. This is believed to be the best explanation for biblical statements that identify the communion meal with Jesus’ body and blood (John 6:53-58; Luke 22:19-20; 1 Corinthians 11:26-27), as well as the testimony of the historic church.

Counter Assertions

The guest on the show did not believe that transubstantiation takes place, or even can take place. He begins with the assertion that, “Obviously it’s contrary to the word of God, there’s just no doubt about that. If you just read the Bible, you know it’s just contrary to it.” Instead of providing biblical support for such an accusation, he simply goes on to ridicule the very idea of transubstantiation:

“I don’t know how anybody makes sense out of that. I know that I could never believe in the viewpoint that something looks identical to bread and wine, but it’s actually the blood and body of a human being [is] just outrageous.”

The guest’s inability to make sense of transubstantiation is hardly an argument, and it will not be treated as such here. But notice that it is the fact that bread and wine do not change in appearance that makes him think the idea of transubstantiation is “outrageous.” Oddly, that is exactly what the doctrine teaches should happen. This will become important later.  He goes on:

“I mean just from a philosophical standpoint that is just . . . I don’t understand how someone could hold to that. It’s very counter-intuitive  In fact I would say that it’s more obvious that things can’t be that way. It’s impossible.”

The guest’s incredulity and intuitions may be interesting features of his psychology but, again, these provide no argument that transubstantiation is actually impossible. This connection, though, between his incredulous intuition are important. He continues:

“It’s almost as if – I’ve heard it explained this way, I don’t even know if a Roman Catholic would agree with this – but God hides Christ, and he kind of deludes our senses and . . . God deceives us almost, and we are in fact seeing Christ’s body and blood right there. . . . You have God deceiving us in worship which I’m sure does not seem like something the most perfect being would do. . . . It’s God messing with our cognitive faculties.”

Fortunately the guest admits that this is just how he has “heard” transubstantiation described – not what the doctrine actually teaches. But since he apparently thinks it is relevant, some things should be said.

First, by complaining that the bread and wine do not appear to be flesh and blood, he is actually affirming the conclusion one would reach by believing in the doctrine of transubstantiation. Whether or not the bread and wine had been transubstantiated, the bread and wine would not appear to have changed (any more than a living tree branch might not appear different when initially cut off of a tree). That’s just a common feature of substantial changes, and is exactly what transubstantiation says will be the case. Thus, neither the philosophy nor the theology behind transubstantiation are threatened by this (understandable) intuition.

Second, as to being “deluded” or “deceived” by God, this would be no more true in transubstantiation than in other instances of substantial change that do not involve accidental change. Those who believe in transubstantiation are not making a false judgment based on “deluded senses” (whatever that would be), because there is no accidental change to perceive. Their judgment is based on faith in the substantial change that is not perceived. This last point reveals the critical area of failure for this methodology, as will be fleshed out(!) below.

In his closing statements, the guest continues to eschew argumentation and opts for more rhetoric:

“If you allow for such a thing it’s possible that . . .  a car could be the entire Soviet Union . . . you can see that this is just so beyond any common sense or any sort of rationality. I don’t know how people affirm this. I think it is extremely counter-intuitive and I find it highly implausible and that’s one of the reasons – apart [from] you know, the Gospel  and sola scriptura are just reasons –  why I just say on a theological level and on a philosophical level, I just cannot buy this – I don’t know how people do it.”

The fact that the guest cannot imagine how people believe in transubstantiation is, again,  simply a report on his own thinking and forms little-to-no support. Analogies are not arguments, and no evidence from the Gospels or from sola scriptura is offered. Although he knows he is dealing with a philosophical explanation for a theological teaching, nothing is offered  in the way of philosophical or theological disproof. All he has to offer is invective against something he cannot see.

Faith and Plausibility

For the guest, the fact that transubstantiation goes “beyond any common sense or any sort of rationality,” and is “extremely counter-intuitive,” and is “highly implausible,” makes the doctrine simply unbelievable for him. Now, all these unsupported assertions would hardly be worth mentioning except that they reveal something of great importance for all Christians. If the thinking behind this dismissal of transubstantiation is legitimate, it may threaten the Christian faith itself – for Christianity stands or falls on many truths that would fall into the above categories if his method is followed.

Consider the doctrine of the Atonement: Christianity teaches that because a man got nailed to a piece of wood anddied that somehow humanity can be freed from the power of sin. Well, we don’t see that happening at the crucifixion. Thousands of people were nailed to crosses back then, and nothing came of it. It would certainly seem “highly implausible,” therefore, that Jesus’ death could have been spiritually significant.

Moreover, consider the doctrine of Jesus’ Incarnation: Jesus was clearly a human being with all the limitations of humanity, yet Christianity teaches that he was also deity. Not only does such a doctrine go “beyond any common sense or any sort of rationality” . . . not only is such an idea  ”extremely counter-intuitive” . . . it seems completely impossible! How can one thing be both material and immaterial, finite and infinite? These are not just big differences – they appear to be contradictory.

Now the doctrines of the Atonement and the Incarnation are not believed because of anything that can be verified by our senses or by philosophy, of course. They are matters of faith, founded on facts that point to the truth of Christianity and believed by God’s grace. Thus, a skeptic’s incredulity is of no consequence with regard to whether or not these doctrines ought to be believed. Christianity teaches them, and Christians believe them.

Further, these doctrines seem much more difficult to believe than transubstantiation. Which is more difficult to believe: that one finite, material thing can be changed into another finite, material thing via a process similar to that which occurs every day – or that contradictory properties can coexist in one being, or that something as particular and physical as a man’s death on a cross could have such far-reaching and spiritual effects?*

Conclusion

The fact that the guest not only did not provide good arguments against transubstantiation but also substituted his own intuitions and rationalisms for good arguments is a huge problem. His unsupported assertions are exactly the kinds of attacks atheists use against Christianity’s other claims. If one cannot accept transubstantiation simply because it “seems” so “counter-intuitive” or “implausible,” I fail to see why one would remain a Christian at all.

Now, none of this means that transubstantiation is true or that it should be accepted. It may be that, as was implied, transubstantiation is in conflict with the Bible or can be shown to be philosophically impossible. The point of this article is not simply that the guest failed to offer any good reasons to reject transubstantiation, but that his reasons for rejecting it, if accepted, could easily lead to rejecting the Christian faith itself.

___________________________________________________________________

*These doctrines have been spelled out in much greater detail, which may serve to make them more plausible – but even these explanations are not demonstrations of the sort the guest seems to require for his assent. Further, the doctrine of transubstantiation itself has been defended on biblical, philosophical, theological, and historical grounds.

Ecumenical Abortion Activism

Protesters outside the first anti-abortion organization.

Introduction

In case you haven’t noticed, Roman Catholics and Protestants disagree on many doctrinal matters. While these are often important, I am not considering either side’s view’s dogma here. What matters for this article is not whether these disagreements are justified, or who is on the correct side – but whether or not it is OK for these two groups to work together on something both sides can agree upon: the need to end human abortion.

While Catholics are more than willing to work side-by-side with Protestants to end abortion, the reverse is often not the case. It is this issue I wish to write about today, specifically in response to the kind of thinking represented by writers like Justin Edwards at Airo (who thinks partnering with the ecumenical anti-abortion powerhouse 40 Days for Life is sinful, deceitful, and a stumbling block), Jon Speed at Crown Rights (who says Catholicism’s moral loopholes are in conflict with the Word of God), or Toby Harmon at Abolish Human Abortion (who does not think Catholics are Christians “at all”*).

While I understand that these writer’s have a strong aversion to Catholic theology, their divisive reaction to partnering for the sake of saving the lives of the unborn is simply baffling to me. If abortion truly is murder, then what these people are saying is tantamount to arguing that only evangelical Christians should be allowed to stop murders from occurring! Even if Rome’s gospel were utterly false, how would that detract from the efficacy of its Pro-Life stance and actions throughout history?

I am no expert on these matters (I have to remain behind the scenes when it comes to abortion activism, because I am quite sure violence would ensue if I got too close to an abortion clinic or militant pro-abortionists), but it seems to me just obviously false that the conclusions reached by these folks are even coherent. Thus, for any who might be  thinking along their lines, I offer a brief summary of the history and state of the Christian pro-life movement and some suggestions for moving forward.

History and State of the Christian Pro-Life Movement

A.D. 30 – 1973

From first century sources on up to today, the Christian Church has forbid abortion (which was commonplace even in early pagan culture). Continuously and to this day both the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Church teach that abortion is murder. Before Roe v. Wade, the pro-life (“right-to-life”) movement was almost entirely Catholic (in fact the only coordinated opposition to abortion came from Catholic organizations), and even after the Roe v. Wade the strongest anti-abortion voice was Catholic (e.g., the National Right to Life Committee). It has been fairly said that the Catholic Church created the right-to-life movement, and it was the Catholic Church that was targeted by the pro-abortion movement:

What paved the way for Roe was NARAL. Founded by Lawrence Lader in 1969, he knew he had to take down the greatest defender of the unborn, the Catholic Church. . . . the original members all agreed that anti-Catholicism was “probably the best strategy we had.” (source)

1973 – Today

Sadly, it was not until decades after Roe v. Wade that some conservative Protestant and Evangelical groups became a force in opposition to abortion. Not only did they show up late in the game, they sometimes began on the opposing side (worse, others never left it).

According to Pew Forum, the Southern Baptist Convention today believes that abortion is allowable only in cases where there is a direct threat to the life of the woman. However, according to Randall Herbert Balmer in his book Thy Kingdom Come, the Southern Baptist Convention:

• originally officially advocated for loosening of abortion restrictions.
• called for “work for legislation that will allow the possibility of abortion under such conditions as rape, incest, clear evidence of severe fetal deformity, and carefully ascertained evidence of the likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, and physical health of the mother.”
• wrote in the Baptist Press, “Religious liberty, human equality and justice are advanced by the [Roe v. Wade] Supreme Court Decision.”

Even among more conservative Christians there has been a spotty history. Evangelical scholar Norman Geisler, for example, has argued on both philosophical and biblical grounds that abortion is murder – but this was not his original position. In his widely used 1971 textbook Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, Geisler:

• stated that, “the one clear thing which the Scriptures indicate about abortion is that it is not the same as murder. . . . [because] an unborn baby is not fully human . . . (Ex. 21:22)” (p. 218).
• argued that abortion is not murder because life itself has not started and because the embryo is only potentially (or, in some cases “sub-“) human (p. 219).
• considered babies born of incest to be an instance of the “flowering” of evil (p. 223).
• concluded that abortion was justifiable for several reasons (therapeutic, eugenic, incestual, etc.).

Despite its rocky start, a significant voice heard from other Christian conservative groups – and this is great news. One must ask, however, why it took them so long to get in the fight, and why the majority of the pro-life movement today remains Catholic. Further, while there are now many in the pro-life movement from non-catholic groups, there remain groups that either ride the fence, or are simply on the wrong side.

The National Association of Evangelicals, for example, opposes abortion on demand but does “not wish to exalt a one-size-fits-all approach to abortion reduction,” and considers abortion permissible in cases of fetal deformity, threat to the health of the mother, or when a pregnancy results from rape or incest. Worse, there are entire mainline Protestant denominations that remain open to abortio, such as the Episcopal Church, the Lutheran Church (ELCA), the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), and the United Church of Christ.

Temporal and Eternal Salvation

It seems to me that if any group has the upper hand in this intramural war over ecumenical abortion activism it is the Catholics – and yet it is they who continue to be willing to join hands with those outside their group in the fight. Maybe the  johnny-come-lately’s of Protestantism and Evangelicalism should re-think their strategy when it comes to this human effort. Dogma, even over salvific issues, should not obscure what is at stake here.

Abortion is an evil, vile act that must be stopped if at all possible. The struggle to save a physical life today and the one to save an soul for eternity will not always exactly overlap.  We can all agree that the gospel is ultimately the answer to the evil of abortion in general. But that does not make it the only answer to a particular abortion that is about to take place.

Eternal  salvation involves a spiritual battle that has many fronts. The abortion clinic sidewalk, on the other hand, may be the last chance these babies have today. It is their life to fight for first. The primary job of the sidewalk counselor, then, should be to act as the last line of defense – to convince a woman to seek alternatives to abortion and save her baby – not to proselytize her. God can do his converting work without letting babies die over confusing doctrinal disputes. Handing out gospel tracts and waving Mary posters should not get in the way of convincing women to not murder their babies.

Conclusion

It must be admitted that there are fanatics and fundamentalists on both sides of this civil war. The question that must be asked is: Do we really need to take the battle to the clinic sidewalk for these poor women to see? Angrily proselytizing or fighting each other while women go in to take part in the horror of abortion is simply sick, and it only makes it easier to ignore us when offering them an alternative choice. Christian disunity has consequences that both sides should fear (John 17), so let’s all get over ourselves.

In the end, if abortion really is murder, then it should be treated in the same way as murder. Evangelical Protestants would work with a Catholic (or Mormon, or Atheist!) police officer to stop a murderer from killing children, so there should not be a problem working together with Catholics (or Mormons, or Atheists!) if it means saving more of the unborn.

This post, my 250th, is in honor of the birth of my baby girl (and the stealing of my heart) 18 months ago today.

Of Christians and Scotsmen

One of my favorite logical fallacies (if for no other reason than the name) is the No True Scotsman fallacy. It arises when one offers counter-examples to a given position which are then dismissed because they are not, allegedly, true (i.e., actual) counter-examples to that position.

It might go something like this:

Hamish: “No Scotsmen drink with the Irish.”
Tavish: “What about Angus? He drinks with the Irish.”
Hamish: “That’s because Angus is not a true Scotsman.”

The reason this is a logical fallacy (when it is a true fallacy, of course) is that it makes one’s conclusion unfalsifiable, and therefore suspect.

A recent post from Christian Apologetics Alliance made use of this fallacy when discussing the author’s conversion from atheism. As I read it, it occurred to me that the same sort of thing goes on in Christian circles as well when dealing with fallen-away believers. In researching for this article I discovered that I was not the only one who made this connection. The entry on the No True Scotsman Fallacy at Logical Fallacies concludes with this:

In some Christian groups, for example, there is an idea that faith is permanent, that once one becomes a Christian one cannot fall away. Apparent counter-examples to this idea, people who appear to have faith but subsequently lose it, are written off using the ‘No True Scotsman’ fallacy: they didn’t really have faith, they weren’t true Christians.

Whether or not a believer can fall away from the faith is a huge debate among Christians. Two major positions, Calvinism and Arminianism, seem to lead the pack of rival theories. Basically, Arminians believe that just as belief makes one a believer, unbelief makes one an unbeliever and, because man retains free will after conversion, he may become an unbeliever after conversion (e.g., John 6:66-71).

Calvinists, on the contrary,  hold to the notion of “the perseverance of the saints” Monergism.com has this description of the doctrine:

God infallibly preserves in faith all of those he has given to the Son (John 6:37, 39, 44, 63-65) so that they are never lost. It maintains that none who are truly redeemed by Christ can be condemned for their sins or finally fall away from the faith.

Note the qualification to “redeemed” above: “truly.” This is how Calvinists explain those who [only] seem to fall away. If a Christian becomes a non-believer, then they were never really a Christian in the first place.

Wherever one falls in response to the problem of fallen Christians, a response is necessary because ex-Christians exist. It is just that simple. I, personally, have several friends who were as “Christian” as can be some time ago who are now quite secular, or even atheistic. I would have put their “spirituality” up against any believers I know now. So what happened?

I think two responses are in order. Theologically, one should come to some conclusion concerning fallen Christians if for no other reason than one should have a coherent theology, and this data has to fit it. It is an interesting theological debate, but one that ultimately becomes practically moot. First, neither theory is provable or falsifiable on the grounds of fallen believers, because both account for them: if a person falls from belief then that person was either never “truly” a believer and there was simply no way to know it, or  that person was a true believer and now is not.

Practically, however, I do not think it matters very much. In neither view can we know who a “true” believer is to begin with (even if we can know “what” constitutes a true believer  we cannot know an individual person’s heart). So who, practically speaking, cares? If a person claims to be a Christian, I encourage their growth in truth and righteousness. If a person claims to be a non-Christian, I do my best to present the gospel and persuade that person of its truth. Whatever a person “truly” was yesterday, or last year, or decades ago, does not change that.

The End of Man (Happiness!)

“Truly here is the light of the Church.
Here he found the entire way of discipline.”

Why Are We Here?

This life often does not make sense to us. It can seem like a wildly fun ride one moment, and a terrifying roller coaster the next. Undeserving people often seem to have it easy, while “the really good ones” can get thrown to the ground over and over again. As Jim Halpert once said on The Office, “OK Universe – you win.”

So what gives? I think that a lot of our issues derive from misguided expectations. We (rightly) desire happiness, and it seems like life is kind of pointless if we can’t get it. It’s easy enough for a Christian to say, “Oh but we have HEAVEN to look forward to!!!” But in the face of real suffering, especially when it seems pointless, that can ring rather hollow. As I have written about in other places, suffering can prepare us for something better – even make us appreciate it more.

But what is “it”?

For the answer to this (ultimate) question I will turn to St. Thomas Aquinas whose answer was (ultimate) happiness.

Saint Thomas Aquinas: “Treatise on Happiness”

St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiæ has three major sections: (1) God and his Creatures, (2) Man’s Happiness in General and Particular Virtues & Vices, and (3) Jesus Christ (who can account for 1 and 2). Sections I-II, q. 1-5 are known collectively as The Treatise on Happiness. Here Aquinas deals with the subject of what mankind is “here for.” After this, Aquinas considers things in which man’s happiness consists. This will be briefly summarized below.

Acting Toward “Ends”

Now the end is the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher states. Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end. (Aquinas)

All people are moved by their will toward some goal. If this were not true, then we would not do one thing rather than another. We could not make choices if we had no means of doing so, nor any standard by which to know which choices to make.

Our wills have an “appetite” for goodness. Whenever we choose to do something, we are always doing so for some good that our mind (intellect) apprehends. Even if what we do is a bad thing, we still do it for some good that we wish to obtain (e.g., stealing for wealth). That’s just how the will is, I won’t belabor the point here.

“According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or praise.” (Augustine)

Our acts are considered human acts (not just acts of humans – like snoring), when they proceed from a deliberate will. The principle of human acts is the end. This is to say that human acts are judged according to their goals. For example, if I drown trying to save a drowning child it is not considered suicide and punished, but rather heroic and rewarded. Thus, whenever we do something we:

1. have a reason for doing so
2. that reason is for some good (N.B. – not necessarily a moral good)
3. our acts are judged based on the reason for doing them (their end)

An Ultimate “End”

If we try to trace out the good our wills seek, we must realize that it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends. If there were no last end (intent), nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its goal, nor would we ever come to see an act as truly finished.

This is exemplified well when two year-olds keep asking why something is the case. At some point you just have to say “because.” It cannot go on to infinity, or there would be no reason at all.

Further, this ultimate end must be one. The will cannot be directed to many things at the same time if all of them ultimate. Chaos would ensue, decisions could not be made. It would be intolerable, for our will’s appetite would never really be satisfied (it may seem like this is the case anyway! But keep reading – this is actually part of the evidence for Aquinas’s ultimate conclusion).

Finally, to be the ultimate good presupposes intermediate goods. Our wills can tend toward these as well, for we desire all under the aspect of good even if it is not the perfect good. One need not always be thinking of the last end – but all others will be

Identifying the Ultimate End

All men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. (Augustine)

It might not seem like everyone could agree on an ultimate end. Different people have different desires. However, they all desire those different things for the same reason - the thing in which the last end is realized. In other words – everyone wants what they want because it is good, and possessing good things makes us happy.

Aquinas notes that Aristotle says, “man’s ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation.” But above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to in the future. This is perfect happiness, what Aquinas calls Beatitude. It is the ultimate perfection of our intellect and will – full knowledge and full goodness, leaving behind no remainder for these appetites to “hunger” for. All other things that people might consider as their ultimate end turn out to be means they use to attempt to attain this true end.

External Goods

For example – what about external goods?

• WEALTH? No. Our ultimate happiness cannot consist in material wealth because money is only sought for the sake of something else,
• HONOR? No. Honor is given to a person because of some excellence that is in the person honored. Being excellent certainly makes one happy, but if such an excellence is already possessed, honor does not add to it.
• FAME? No. Man’s happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory because in order to attain it, others must know of that which would give one fame. Because knowledge often fails, human glory is frequently deceptive. (“Many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful?” – Boethius).
• POWER? No. It is impossible for ultimate happiness to consist in power because power can be used for both good and evil, and evil, by definition, cannot be the ultimate good.

Happiness is man’s supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil, but all the above (and others alleged ultimate goods) can be found both in good and in evil people. Further, ultimate happiness cannot lack any needful good, but after acquiring any one of the foregoing, one may still lack many goods that are necessary to him. Or lose them – which causes fear of loss. Thus none can bring ultimate happiness.

Bodily Goods

Perhaps once external goods are eliminated as being truly ultimate, personal goods such as the body itself may be considered. After all, the external goods are mostly means to attaining goods for the body, right?

No, Aquinas says this will not do either!

It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in the goods of the body, because while humans surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness, in bodily goods we are surpassed by many animals. This is not usually considered a problem, for things differ in what is good for them depending on what they are. It would not be considered a good, for example, for a human to wallow in the mud, but it is a good for a pig.

Now, humans are composed of soul and body. While the body depends on the soul, the soul does not depend on the body. Thus, the soul has a primacy for us that it does not for animals, which cease to exist upon death. Because bodily delights require a body, and the body is not the highest principle of a human person, no goods for the body can be the human being’s ultimate good.

The Good of the Soul

It might seem like we have now reached the end of our quest for the ultimate end. If not in our own soul, then where? Aquinas does not think so, though, because the soul is made for other things. We attain happiness through our souls, but not because of them (otherwise simply being a human would be perfect happiness, as being human requires having a soul). Thus Aquinas concludes that, ” happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.”

Uncreated Goodness

If nothing external, nor internal, to us can be the ultimate good that will make us ultimately happy, then what is left? Those two categories cover all of creation! It must not, then, be something that is created.

Here is Aquinas’s step-by-step explanation:

1. Happiness is the perfect good, which would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired.
2. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true.
3. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good.
4. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. God is goodness as such.
5. Therefore, God alone can satisfy the will of man.

The Ultimate End: Happiness in God

God alone constitutes man’s happiness. God is the last end of man and, indeed, of all other things. Eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from John 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.”

Because humans have the two appetites of the intellect and will – truth and goodness – God, who alone is infinite truth and goodness, alone can perfectly satisfy man’s intellect and will. Therefore, if we are to attain our last end and ultimate happiness, we must know and love God (satisfying both the intellect and the will).

But love is the desiring of good as well as unity with the good sought. Man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek, and while on earth we can only attain the finite goods offered to us by creation (one reason idolatry is so tempting – cf. Romans 1:18-23). But “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and we shall see Him as He is.” (1 John 3:2). Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence – which we will get in heaven.

Thus can Aquinas conclude:

Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists.

Augustine (a bit more poetically) opined:

Almighty God, you have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in you.

And look at this! The answer was in the Bible the whole time:

And I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away. (Revelation 21:3-4)

Aquinas on Abortion

Introduction

The Christian Church was against  against abortion from the earliest days (see The Fathers on Abortion). It can be something of an embarrassment, then, for Christians to discover that the views of the Church’s greatest theologian, Thomas Aquinas, have been used to support abortion.

The specific view in question has to do with Aquinas’s statement that God created the rational human soul in the body sometime after conception: namely, 40 days for males and 80 or 90 days for females (Commentary on the Book of Sentences, Bk. III, d.2, q.5, a.2, resp). Thus, it is argued, early abortion for Aquinas would not be murder, because what was being killed was not yet human.

Nor is this just some urban legendsustained in its existence by e-mail chains or popular blogs. This view of Aquinas was even cited in Roe v. Wade:

“It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before “quickening” – the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy 20 – was not an indictable offense. . . . [which] appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. . . . Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th century, there was otherwise little agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. . . . Due to continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and perhaps to Aquinas’ definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life” (ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): IV.3)

But would Aquinas agree that this modern position is a legitimate conclusion from his beliefs? I will argue that he most certainly would not.

Aquinas or Aristotle?

The first thing to realize is that that Aquinas wrote prior to the age of modern scientific methodology (he preceded even Roger Bacon) and technology. Natural science at the time was often more akin to what is more narrowly defined as philosophy today. Empirical data was lacking, and so the timing of “ensoulment” (the coming to be of the rational soul in a body) was based on simple observations. When Aquinas stated that the rational soul came to be in the body at 40 or 80/90 days, he was merely following Aristotle (History of Animals Bk. 7, pt. 3).

Now, conclusions follow from principles joined to particulars, for example: “All men are mortal” (principle), “Socrates is a man” (particular), therefore “Socrates is mortal” (conclusion). Both principle and particular must be true for the conclusion to follow as necessarily true. Thus, to conclude based on Aquinas’s mistaken trust of Aristotle’s particular position on the timing of ensoulment that he would agree with the early abortion advocates’ conclusion would fail without showing that it would follow from Aquinas’s principles and the confirmed particulars of modern science.

Philosophy or Science?

Aquinas got his “particulars” from the common science of his day. He applied his philosophical principles to the particulars supplied by authorities in other disciplines. Mistakes in Aquinas’s conclusions (or illustrations) are often traceable to the mistakes of the “scientists” he relied upon for particular facts about nature etc. The combination is sometimes difficult to distinguish, but it is important here – for if Aquinas were supplied with today’s accurate scientific particulars then it is probable that he would not believe in post-conception ensoulment.

In brief, Aquinas taught that male sperm combined with female (menstrual) blood and acted upon it as a formative power that produced first a body with a “vegetative soul” (i.e., one that was alive but not sentient). Then, once the material was organized to a sufficient degree the vegetative soul was replaced by an “animal soul” (i.e., one that was sentient but not rational). Once this body had become sufficiently organized it could then receive a “rational soul.” It was at this point that God would specially create what we today more commonly refer to as a “soul” (i.e., a human soul) for the body and the fetus would be fully human. Again, this was said to occur around day 40 for males and 80 or 90 for females.

Today, however, we know that the sperm is not just an organizing power – it makes up the material cause of the body as well. Further, menstrual blood has nothing to do with the process, but rather the ovum – which is also a material cause of the body. Once the two are joined both cease to exist, however, with no remainder. Thus, on Aquinas’s account whatever life-giving principle grows this new unity into a full-grown human body must be present immediately.

Now, there is a lot more detail to Aquinas’s position (see SCG 2.88, and Haldane and Lee) - but in reality the more detailed one gets, the more problems for a post-conception ensoulment become. Thus, although Aquinas’s philosophy might exclude the traducian view of conception, his principles would, in light of modern scientific knowledge, seem to lead him to view conception and ensoulment as twin features of the single event of human creation. Thus, any abortion would indeed be murder.

Aquinas on Abortion

Aquinas never really deals with abortion per se, but he does have a few things to say that bear upon it implicitly.

In his commentary on murder (ST IIae, q.64, a.8) he cites Exodus 21:22 concerning the killing of a pregnant woman and concludes that, “the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide.”

Elsewhere,  Aquinas writes concerning whether or not a woman should be “opened up” to permit the baptizing of a pre-born baby whose life is in danger that it should not be done because murder is not excusable to save another life (ST III, q.68, a.11). The point for this discussion is that the infant was indeed considered to be alive and, virtually, able to be baptized.

NOTE: At the very least the act of abortion would remain a grave sin even if it was not seen as the murder of a human being. Following from the Church’s view that the materials of  human life garnered respect as such (and hence, the Church’s prohibitions against masturbation and contraception), an abortion would still be destroying that which was to become a rational animal (cf. Augustine on Abortion and Ensoulment).

Conclusion

Despite what some may think could be done with Aquinas’s position on the timing of ensoulment, given Aquinas’s principles it seems clear that Aquinas would not conclude the same things given today’s science. In any case, however, was in line with the Church on this issue – and thus it would be illicit to ascribe any kind of pro-abortion stance to him.

As evidence of this, once science corrected Aristotle’s erroneous thoughts on ensoulment, the Church was quick to apply its theology and philosophy to this new knowledge. Haldane and Lee report that as early as 1879 papers were being published arguing for a coincidence of conception and ensoulment (e.g., ‘De animatione foetus’ in Nouvelle Revue Theologique), and as these views took hold in science and philosophy they were adopted. By the end of the 19th Century the Roman Catholic Church (who considers Aquinas to be the supreme theologian) declared that  excommunication was required for abortion at any stage of pregnancy. (Unfortunately, while early Protestant church leaders such as Martin Luther and John Calvin were anti-abortion, but many Protestant denominations followed the secular drift in the 1960′s and have not found their way back. Evangelicals seem to have come around in the late 1970′s.)

Thus, based on application of Aquinas’s principles to modern knowledge of conception’s particulars, his actual statements that touch on the issue of abortion, and the reaction of the Church to the modern scientific understanding of conception, it is safe to conclude that Aquinas cannot legitimately be used to bolster a pro-abortion stance.

Conformation, Transformation, Legalism, Gnosticism, Justification, Sanctification, and Glorification

“I appeal to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship. Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that by testing you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect.”
(Romans 12:1-2 ESV)

Why Be Good?

The apostle Paul introduces the transition from the theology of Romans chapters 1-11 to the ethical commands of 12-16 with the above verses. Until recently this passage was troubling for me because I was never clear on why our actions mattered.

Of course, it seems self-evident that we should do good and sacrifice for God, but I had difficulty relating this intuition with the theology I was being taught. First I was taught that we are saved by grace through faith as a gift not by works (Eph 2:8-9), so works don’t matter for the past. Then I was told that because we don’t get salvation by works, so we don’t keep salvation by works (Galatians), so works don’t matter for the present. Finally, I was promised that Christians will be sinners until we are glorified and made perfect, so works don’t matter for the future either. Well, that’s the whole package, so – ultimately – works must not matter. This conclusion seemed obviously false, however – and the tension between this form of the gospel message and what Scripture actually teaches is the subject of this post.

First, I discovered that the Apostle Paul says a lot of good stuff about doing good works. Ephesians 2:10 (which completes the 2:8-9 passage quoted above), for example, says we are saved for good works! And there are verses like these:

“God “will give to each person according to his works. To those who by persistence in good works seek glory, honor and immortality, he will give eternal life” (Rom. 2:6-7).

“Present your members to serve righteousness for sanctification” (Rom. 6:19).

“And let us not grow weary of doing good, for in due season we will reap, if we do not give up” (Gal. 6:9).

“Work out your salvation with fear and trembling, For God is one who, for his good purpose, works in you both to desire and to work” (Phil. 2:12-13)

“That they do good, that they be rich in good works, ready to distribute, willing to communicate; Laying up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life” (1 Tim 6:18-19).

Further, it is widely recognized that Paul’s epistles typically begin with theology (orthodoxy) and end with morality (orthopraxy). My question, then, was why would Paul have so much to say about what we think and do if what we do does not ultimately matter?

Works, Works, Works

The first key to the solution was in in the distinction Paul makes between three kinds of works.

First, Paul uses “works” to refer to sin. These are “works of the flesh,” the sinful attitudes and deeds we all commit (Galatians 5:19; Romans 13:12; 1 Corinthians 6: 9-11). Obviously we aren’t saved by or for these!

Second are “works of the law.” These are precepts of the Mosaic Law that were given to Israel in the Old Covenant. These are not necessary for salvation, and acting as if they are is the false teaching of legalism (Gal. 2:3, 12-16; 4:10; 5:2).

Finally we come to “good works,” namely moral and ethical good deeds (Romans 2:16, 21-26; Galatians 6: 7-10). These do matter to salvation, for (as will be shown below) “good works” are the basis on which people will be judged by God and receive either reward or punishment (e.g., 1 Cor. 6: 9-10; Gal. 5:21; 2 Cor. 5:10).

If the distinction between “works of the law” and “good works” is not made then 1 Corinthians 7: 19 would make no sense: ”Circumcision means nothing and uncircumcision means nothing; what matters is keeping God’s commandments.” Circumcision was a command of God, so this verse would be saying that keeping God’s commandments both does and does not matter!

Further, commanding good works, or basing rewards/punishments on them, is not legalism. Legalism makes the performance of good works a sufficient condition for salvation – obligating God to save based on our own merit. But if good works modify a salvation we already have, then the charge of legalism is moot (this view also keeps one from sliding into licentiousness – bonus!). These works are from salvation, not for it – but they do matter.

Now, on to Romans 12:1-2, which is the hinge between the theological and ethical sections of Romans.

Conformation and Transformation

“Form” refers to what something is (not just its “shape”). To CON-form, then, is to share a form – it is being the same thing. TRANS-form means changing from one form to another – becoming a new thing. As sinners, we are worldly (conformed to the world). As saints we are to become godly (transforming into god-like people).

“Religion that is pure and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their affliction and to keep oneself unstained from this world” (Jas 1:27).

“And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, . . . predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son” (Romans 8:28-29).

“And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another. For this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit” (2 Cor. 3:18).

“You may become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped from the corruption that is in the world because of sinful desire” (2 Peter 1:4).

Note that this transformation from conformity to the world to conformity with God comes by ridding ourselves of sin - not just changing our thoughts / beliefs. We don’t often hear this because of a fear of legalism that, I think, is itself based on a subtle, ancient heresy.

Gnosticism

The Gnostics were one of the earliest “Christian cults.” They drew a complete distinction between matter and spirit, and claimed that matter was evil and spirit was good, period. This, and other, false beliefs led to some specifically Christian heresies. Theological Heresy #1 was a denial of Jesus’s incarnation – for how could God take on matter? Moral heresy also followed, for actions performed in the body only affected the body and so did not affect salvation – only what the mind thought (gnosis). IN a sense, then, the Gnostics avoided legalism by substituting it with licentiousness.

Today there are few Christians who would affirm Gnosticism per se, but what one of my pastors called a “practical Gnosticism” often remains. Sometimes this comes out in how the Bible is understood. The “flesh”  is thought to refer to our physical bodies, when it refers to the sin nature (Rom. 7:5; 8:9 cf. Col. 3:5, and Gal. 5). The “world” is sometimes thought to mean the earth / physical / material realm, when it really refers to sin. But these are both Gnostic-like mistakes:

“If you were of the world, the world would love its own. Yet because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you” (John 15:19).

“I have given them Your word; and the world has hated them because they are not of the world, just as I am not of the world. I do not pray that You should take them out of the world, but that You should keep them from the evil one. They are not of the world, just as I am not of the world” (John 17:14).

“Do not love the world or the things in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world – the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life – is not of the Father but is of the world. And the world is passing away, and the lust of it; but he who does the will of God abides forever” (1 John 2:15).

“Adulterers and adulteresses! Do you not know that friendship with the world is enmity with God? Whoever therefore wants to be a friend of the world makes himself an enemy of God” (James 4:4).

Beyond the strictly theological realm, however, in subtle ways the physical often is denigrated in the attempt to be spiritual. Popular Christian culture excuses its low-grade, derivative music and movies because these come packaged with “good messages.” The churches are plain because don’t want to distract people with beautiful imagery. The layout focuses our attention on a lectern because that’s where “the message” (=the preacher’s thoughts) is delivered. We excuse inappropriate clothing because “God looks at the heart.” Worship music is chosen based on what will get people in the door so they can hear “the message.” Sacraments / Ordinances are practiced and in any way we wish because they’re just symbols. Christian leaders can get away with immorality as long as they “teach truth” (= a “good message”).

I think all of these are signs that many Christians today have fallen for the false dichotomy between the material and immaterial. What we think takes almost complete precedence over what we do.

Virtue: Belief and Action

Perhaps the balance between legalism and licentiousness comes in the relation of the body to the spirit. We are both body and spirit– one “thing” with two principles. It is not the case that “we ARE a soul, we just HAVE a body.” Our bodies are not “earth suits” for the soul. The perfect state for humans is not disembodiment. We do not become angels when we die. We are physical beings in a material world that God calls “good” (Gen. 1).

This is why we are resurrected and why Jesus incarnated. He saved ALL of us – not just our minds or hearts. And if the body is important then what we DO is important. This is the basis for an ethical system that I think explains much of what we read in Scripture. It’s called Virtue Ethics, and basically what it teaches is that how we think and act depends on what we are – and  what we think and how we act changes what we are.

The easiest way to think about it is what we call habits. Our first habitual act is often difficult because we are not used to it. Habits are formed when we DO something repeatedly with pleasurable results. But habits are not just things stuck on to us – they are us. When we change our actions, our thinking changes too. Our actions affect our will, and our wills direct our minds. When we choose certain actions, these strengthen our wills, thus redirecting our minds. Actions that create pleasure will be seen as making us happy. If what we choose does make us happy we return to it much easier next time. This is the process of transformation/conformation. New habits breed new thinking. How we think and act determine what we are.

Conformation to the world is habitually operating in our sin nature. Transformation of the mind requires new habits: not just new thinking in the mind but new acting in the body. Thus, spirituality is not just about the spirit  (our minds) – the physical (our bodies) matters too.

With this understanding of how actions and the mind go together, Romans 12:1-2 made a lot more sense! What we do with our bodies is a spiritual act. And that means the physical matters.

The physical matters in our FAITH. Music matters: I want to worship God, not “rock for Jesus.” Aesthetics matters: I want candles and incense, not lasers and fog machines. Clothing matters: I want robes and stoles, not skinny jeans and trendy print shirts. Sacraments/Ordinances matter: I want the bread and wine, not crackers and juice. Messages matter, true - but so does the messenger: I want a pastor, not a projector.

The physical matters in our WORKS, too. Our works, though they are not for our salvation [i.e., justification], they do matter to our salvation [i.e., sanctification and glorification]. Works matter in this life because they make us what we will be in the next life. God will perfect us in heaven – but what He will perfect is up to us.

The Judgment, Reward, and Punishment of Believers

This view makes sense out of passages  concerning judgment and rewards and punishment that are applied to saint and sinner alike. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 3:9-15 that, “The fire shall try every man’s work of what sort it is. If any man’s work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man’s work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire.” Wow! Works, judgment, rewards, loss, and salvation all in one passage!

And there are more:

“For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may be paid back according to what he has done while in the body, whether good or evil” (2 Cor. 5:10 cf. Rom. 14:10).

“Behold, I am coming quickly, and My reward is with Me, to render to every man according to what he has done” (Rev. 22:12).

“There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differs from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection” (1 Cor. 15:41-42).

“Be steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, for as you know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord” (1 Corinthians 15:58).

“For God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labor of love” (Hebrews 6:10).

“Do you not know that in a race all the runners run, but only one receives the prize? So run that you may obtain it. And every man that strives for the mastery is temperate in all things. Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible” (1 Corinthians 9:24-25).

“Blessed is the man that endures temptation: for when he is tried, he shall receive the crown of life, which the Lord hath promised to them that love Him” (James 1:12 cf. 2 Tim. 4:8).

“It shall be more tolerable on the day of judgment for Tyre and Sidon than for you. . . . it shall be more tolerable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom than for you” (Mt. 11:22-24).

“Those who devour widows’ houses and for a pretense make long prayers . . . will receive the greater condemnation” (Luke 20:47).

While we often talk of “salvation” when referring to the judgment of God concerning one’s “place” in the afterlife (Heaven or Hell), it means much more than that. From the above verses it seems clear that there are also different levels of reward and punishment (loss) for both those in Heaven and those in Hell. And these differing degrees are determined by works. How do we make sense out of these verses if what we do in this life does not modify our experiences of the afterlife?

Finding God’s Will

Pursuit of this reward is not materialistic or selfish – it is God’s will for us.At the end of the passage in question, Romans 12:1-2., Paul says that by not being conformed to the world and by transforming our minds, we will know God’s will.  And here it is: “This is the will of God, your sanctification” (1 Thess. 4:3).

Our bodily sacrifices are spiritual worship that result in personal sanctification. By doing good works we are sanctified – transformed into godlikeness. When we are godlike we desire what God desires – goodness. To the degree that we love goodness we will be rewarded in heaven - by partaking in goodness. But if we miss out on this process, and remain conformed to the world, much of what we desire and love will not be available to us – for God is all we will have.

So, if Heaven is not going to be a place of any suffering (Rev. 20-21), then God will have to purify us – get rid of the all that is conformed to the world so that we can love only the good and be completely satisfied by it. How much of us will be left? Will we just barely make it (“saved as if through fire”)? If so we will have our reward in full – but our fullness will be lessened because we are lessened. All of our cups will “runneth over” – but how big will our cups be?

So why do good? Why endure suffering? So that we can “glorify God and enjoy Him forever.” This life is not just for getting people off the sinking ship of the world, and neither is it for polishing its brass. We remain alive in part, at least, to prepare our souls for Heaven by being transformed through our lives (which is also by God’s grace – Phil. 2:12-13). Our reward / loss will be the result of what we are conformed to when we get there.

Dante’s Divine Comedy, Inferno: Cantos 10-11 – The Heretics and the Harrowing of Hell

Canto 10

Here we encounter burning tombs full of heretics – mostly Epicureans and others who deny immortality (one has over 1,000 shades in it!). One translation has these called “burning arks” – fascinating as the Church has been considered the saving Ark since ancient times. Missing out on the Ark of salvation they now burn in arks of damnation. The tombs are open now, revealing the flames inside. We are told that after the resurrection these souls will be reunited to their bodies and then sealed in these tombs forever. Terrifying.
The heretics introduce an interesting division in the Inferno. The pagans, whose error was a willful ignorance are on the rim of outer hell. These, however, are found on the rim of inner hell – for they are formal heretics. There are two ways missing the truth: a simple denial, or the failure to assert truth. The formal heretic is in the first class, while the material heretic is in error but it is not truly an act of the will (unless they fail to receive correction when it comes). Thus, because the Epicureans formally taught against immortality and thus that happiness (for them, the avoidance of pain) only existed in this life, they denied the gospel formally. Now they are in immortal pain. You’ve got to hand it to Dante to make the punishment fit the crime. Elsewhere Dante writes, “Of all brutal opinions, that is most foolish, vile and pestilent which holds that there is not life after this one.”

During a multi-facted poltical discussion with one of the tombs’ inmates (in which Dante’s forthcoming exile is foretold), Dante discovers that the damned are allowed by God to see far into the future but not the present or the past. If, at the judgment time effectively ends, all these souls may ponder forever are themselves and their own lives. In Eastern theology, this state is hell itself.

Canto 11

Dante and Virgil exit the tomb area only to withdraw and the stench form the circle below overpowers them. Dante notices a tomb with the name of Pope Anastasius. Dante is the first writer to name a Pope in hell! Anastasius II was Pope in the 5th century during a time of schism (Photinus, who taught a heretical view of Christ and the Incarnation). Anastasius sought to heal the division, and some believed he was making moves toward the heretical Monophysites. There seems to be some historical doubt as to the accuracy of this assessment – it was probably Emperor Anastasius, not the Pope. In any case, Anastasius acquired a reputation as a heretic and became the second Pope not to be recognized as a saint.

Even in the journey’s delay there is a good moral lesson: the stench of hell can be gotten used to. Sin is like that – a little here and there and we learn to live with it. It stops bothering us so much. While Christians certainly must fear the struggle with sin, what should be feared even more is ceasing to struggle against it (in this life)! We must not allow ourselves to become comfortablke with evil. We must fear la divina vendetta.

We find the broken boulders from Christ’s descent into hell to set the captives free at His own death. This doctrine is found in the early Creeds. St. Thomas Aquinas deals with this issue in ST III.Q.52. He says,

“through Christ’s Passion the human race was delivered not only from sin, but also from the debt of its penalty . . .  the death of the body as well as exclusion from glory, . . .  Consequently, when Christ descended into hell, by the power of His Passion He delivered the saints from the penalty whereby they were excluded from the life of glory, so as to be unable to see God in His Essence, wherein man’s beatitude lies, . . . so when Christ descended into hell He delivered the holy Fathers from thence. And this is what is written Zechariah 9:11: “Thou also by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water.” And (Colossians 2:15) it is written that “despoiling the principalities and powers,” i.e. “of hell, by taking out Isaac and Jacob, and the other just souls”

St. John Chrysostom said it so well in his Easter homily:

Hell was in an uproar because it was done away with.
It was in an uproar because it is mocked.
It was in an uproar, for it is destroyed.
It is in an uproar, for it is annihilated.
It is in an uproar, for it is now made captive.
Hell took a body, and discovered God.
It took earth, and encountered Heaven.
It took what it saw, and was overcome by what it did not see.
O death, where is thy sting?

Virgil takes the opportunity to explain hell’s architecture to Dante. In fine Aristotelian fashion (even quoting Ethics and Physics!) we find that the within the sin of malice (willful injury) there is one sin that man aloine can committ, and so God hates it most. This sin is fraud. Virgil tells Dante that because of this their punishment is more painful (more evidence that the lower one goes the worse the sin and the greater the suffering). To avoid spoilers, I won’t go into each circle here. But to summarize: using the medieval church’s view of Aristotle, Dante divides these sins into three: Incontinence, Violence, and Fraud (the three beasts at the foot of the mountain?). Incontinence (sins of weakness) were punished above. Now we will see the fate of the violent and fraudulent.

It is now 3 or 4am of Holy Saturday

The Desires of a Divided Soul

“I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.
(Romans 7:15)

“He is a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways.”
(James 1:8)

“Purity of heart is to will one thing.”
(Sören Kierkegaard)

There is some controversy over whether St. Paul was speaking of the Christian or pre-Christian life in the seventh chapter of Romans. I take the chapter as transitioning at verse 15 where he begins to speak in the present tense, first person. The rest of the chapter is an apt description of the Christian life and one that I am very thankful to have. For otherwise I think the pains of regret we face in this life could be unbearable. It is one thing for Christians to rejoice in their salvation, it is another to live in the tension between our two homes. Death is division – division of the soul from the body, between one person and another, or even within oneself. St. James says to endure that we might take on the characteristics of virtue – and warns that to do otherwise is to divide the mind itself (ch. 1). Paul here gives a picture of the struggle to heal this division.

In Romans 6-7, the question comes down to choosing our master. Prior to salvation we are under the mastery of sin. Sin comes “naturally” – we obey it without question if we can get away with it. We are “free with regard to righteousness.” (How terrifying!). Christians, however, have been liberated from this sin master and given the choice of making Christ our master or returning to the old one. So why in the world would we ever choose the latter?

St. Paul’s illustration here is a good place to start. Imagine a man enslaved to another for many years. He is used to doing what he is told, perhaps without thinking much about it. Then one day he finds himself freed from his slavery. Now suppose this newly freed man is walking down the street one day and runs into his old master who then orders him to perform some task. Because of this man’s past actions and lifestyle, his inclination will be to obey his old master. Even if he knows deep down that he is no longer a slave to the old master, it feels unnatural to disobey. It would be easier and, in a sense, make the man happier, to just do what the old master says even if he is no longer required to do so.

I think this illustrates our post-justification state. Romans 7 is in the “sanctification” section of Romans – not the justification or glorification sections. In this state we are being made into something – indeed, we are being re-formed. But what is it that is being reformed? Not our bodies – no, unfortunately those have to wait. But our souls can be. When St. Paul speaks of trans-formation (instead of conformation to the world), he means the renewal of the mind (Gk. “nous” – the meaning is deper than “intellect” – closer to “inner person”). The renewal or transformation of the mind is the key to ending the division of the soul (St. James, in the quotation above, uses the word dipsuchos - literally “one with two souls”).

When we speak of the mind in human beings we refer to two powers in the soul: the intellect and the will. The intellect seeks truth and the will seeks goodness. When we make a choice, our intellect grabs onto reality (truth) and shows it to the will. When the will identifies something in the intellect as a good it produces desire – specifically desire for union. We want that good! We find rest when we attain the good, and we suffer when we do not. The problem is that in this life there are always multiple – and often competing – goods for the will to consider. Because we live in a finite world, all we have to choose from are limited goods. This limit shows itself in two very frustrating ways.

First, we always want more of a good than we can get. I see pizza, my will seeks it as a good, I eat it, and my will is satisfied – but only temporarily. Eventually my desire for pizza will rekindle. But perhaps by then there is no pizza – no way to fulfill my desire and put my will to rest. Thus, we suffer.  Second, limited goods are often in competition. I want the pizza, but I also want to be fit. I now have two goods to consider, and only one can win. My intellect may be show me more good in one choice than the other, and then the will can more easily do its job. But either way I suffer. We tend to think of choice as something positive – I choose this thing and gain it – but every choice is a choice against a hundred other things. Every choice is a sacrifice, and so every choice involves suffering loss.

This potential loss activates a peculiar ability within the will. Since the will governs my actions, and thinking is an action, my will can, in a limited sense, govern my intellect. If I have two goods before me, my will can direct my intellect to stop thinking about the good of one and only consider the good of the other. This is deliberation (or, often in my case, rationalization) – the will moving the intellect to consider different goods in order to make a choice. But what if the will is divided?

The form or “shape” of the soul (I am speaking non-technically here) just is what our wills and intellects are like. What form does the soul have prior to salvation? One shaped by sin. This form affects the intellect and the will (the two constituents of the human soul), along with the emotions that follow from the body. The picture St. Paul gives of the old master is really us in our pre-justified state. In that state our souls are conformed to sin – the will seeks goods, but does not see many evils for what they are. The intellect presents some possible action (theft, fornication, gossip, lying) and the will (which still seeks good) finds the good in those things (for evil is always a corruption of a good thing, not the thing in itself) and latches on. So for example, if lying will get me out of an uncomfortable social situation, that good may be all my will considers. So I choose to lie, it works, my will finds rest, and my soul conforms to that result. The next time I consider lying, it will seem that much better. And so it continues.

But let us say that I become saved. What is saved? Me of course! In other words, my soul. But it is my soul that has been formed by sinful action that is saved, not replaced.  It is still my soul. That soul with the will that saw lying as a good cannot simply be eradicated or what would salvation mean? Saving a child from getting hit by a car does not consist in letting the child die and replacing him with another. Rather than being replaced, my soul needs to be reshaped or transformed.

To be human in the image of God we must have freedom – we must have wills that can function in non-coerced ways. Yet how can my soul, formed in sin, ever will the highest goods?  Having a book full of rules cannot help unless I see duty as a higher good than anything else my will sees as a good. But because my soul is formed in sin, this is difficult. I want that thing that I cannot afford, and knowing that I am obeying a good rule by not stealing does not satisfy me, because I still want that other good too!

Duty can only get us so far. For the legalist the law functions as a guide but offers no hope of success. For the licentious the law only provokes sin. Duty is a good that must be learned, but it cannot by itself really help us to desire the good. For it is only when the will chooses the good because of its goodness that it can rest in that choice. I might go some time merely following a sense of duty – but I will be miserable. Eventually I will fail and be miserable for failing. In this case there is no way out. Because the soul is divided it is logically impossible to find satisfaction. Pain is all one can choose. Despair will come if the will can never find rest.

I might expect God to simply wipe out the old form of my soul so that my will would only seek true goods. But that would, in a frightening sense, be to act against my will. God would be destroying me in a sense, if He changed my soul without me truly, deeply, desiring it. And can a soul desire itself to be destroyed? No, not truly. But can we desire to not desire? Yes.

The good news is that the soul conformed to sin can be trans-formed. Sinning conformed my soul to sin, doing good will transform my soul into one conformed to good. But this is a process – a process my soul must go through if I am to remain me. God’s salvation begins at justification (thankfully apart from doing good!), but it continues with our actions throughout our Christian life. This is sanctification (“saint-making”). This salvific process is seen in that salvation is said to be by God’s grace through faith (Ephesians 2:8-9), but that this is for good works (Ephesians 2:10). Our works – what we choose to do from now on – will form our souls. Certainly God gives us much help – so much that we can take no credit for what we do (“giving up” our striving against God is hardly a heroic action, but it is an action nonetheless!).

But why bother? If we are justified we will also be glorified (cf. Romans 8). So what does it really matter what we do? I think here we need to consider the nature of death and the afterlife. Eternal life, says Jesus Christ, is knowing God. The division of spiritual death will cease. So the intellect will get to see God – but will we want to? Will we see God as a good? Will our wills rest in Him?

Western theology says yes – God, as the ultimate and infinite good, cannot help but be desired by our will. Being in the presence of God is heaven for all. Eastern theology says no – God as the ultimate and infinite good can be shunned in this life and the next. Being in the presence of God for one who shuns His goodness will hell for them. What is interesting is that both affirm degrees of happiness / suffering in the afterlife, and each affirm that it is the state of the soul at death that determines this experience.

Now, if the state of our souls at death determines our experience of the afterlife, and our souls are in a state of transformation out from sin, and our choices and actions are what reform our souls – then every single thing we do takes on significance. Our post-justification lives are not just an add-on, not just an opportunity to get more people off the sinking ship of the world. It is time for us to prepare for heaven (conversely it is time for unbelievers to prepare their souls for hell).

This makes a lot of sense out of the judgment/reward/punishment language in Scripture that is applied to both saved and unsaved alike. It also helps make sense out of the final state of the moral person who dies in unbelief and the immoral person who experiences a deathbed conversion. It also helps to explain James chapter 1 where we see the function of suffering through trials. Nothing will reform the soul faster than suffering. Suffering helps us to stop willing only finite goods, for they are fleeting and often have bad consequences. And suffering prepares us to even better appreciate the infinite good that we will see “face to face” one day (1 Corinthians 13:12).

But only if we choose to seek it (Mt. 7:7).